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ABSTRACT 
According to Indonesia Village Law 6/2014, village fiscal transfer 
policies provide exclusive funds from the national government to 
the Dana Desa, adding to the existing amended contribution 
funding from regency to village. This paper discusses how this 
fiscal transfer policy for rural development affects local authority 
transfers to villages and residents’ participation in development. 
By using a case study method in Banjar Regency, South 
Kalimantan Province with qualitative surveys in villages and 
interviews, this article makes a number of remarks. Firstly, the 
paper comments on the authority transfer from the regency to the 
villages in public works, agriculture, pre-school education, and 
community-based health services. The projects discussed are 
characterized as infrastructure priorities, community-based 
operations, and non-complex. Banjar Regency agencies have 
accepted this authority transfer because of budget limitations for 
village-level projects. The authority transfer has resulted in 
changes in the Regency’s character from a village-level public 
service provider to an adviser. Secondly, the paper discusses 
residents’ participation in village development. 
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Village fiscal transfers are used mostly in village development projects, 
where local preferences are accommodated; accordingly, the community 
participates in the planning and executing of those projects. However, 
accountability still must be improved despite the perception of the 
corruption indication assumption being low. 
Keywords: Village Fiscal Transfers, Local Authority, Resident 
Participation. 
ABSTRAK 
Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 tentang Desa telah melahirkan 
kebijakan dana transfer baru dari pemerintah pusat yaitu Dana Desa dan 
peningkatan dana dari kabupaten untuk desa. Artikel ini membahas 
bagaimana kebijakan dana desa mempengaruhi kewenangan pemerintah 
kabupaten terhadap desa dan partisipasi masyarakat dalam pembangunan 
desa. Artikel ini mengambil studi kasus di Kabupaten Banjar, Provinsi 
Kalimantan Selatan menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif melalui survei di 
beberapa pemerintah desa dan wawancara dengan pejabat berwenang di 
tingkat kabupaten. Artikel ini menemukan beberapa hal sebagai berikut. 
Aspek pertama, pelimpahan kewenangan dari kabupaten ke desa 
melingkupi bidang pekerjaan umum, pertanian, pendidikan anak usia dini, 
dan pelayanan kesehatan berbasis masyarakat yang semuanya memiliki 
karakter: terwujud dalam bentuk infrastruktur, pelaksanaan berbasis 
masyarakat dan bersifat pekerjaan sederhana (non-kompleks). Adapun 
Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah (SKPD) yang terimbas atas pelimpahan 
kewenangan ini menerima perubahan ini dikarenakan terbatasnya anggaran 
pemerintah kabupaten dalam melaksanakan kegiatan di tingkat desa. 
Pelimpahan kewenangan dari kabupaten ke desa merubah karakter SKPD 
dari pelaksana kegiatan menjadi pembina kegiatan di tingkat desa. Kedua, 
kehadiran dana desa meningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam 
pembangunan desa yang mana juga mencerminkan aspirasi kebutuhan 
masyarakat desa. Partisipasi masyarakat tidak hanya dalam perencanaan 
tetapi juga dalam pelaksanaan pembangunan desa. Akuntabilitas 
pemerintah desa masih harus ditingkatkan meskipun persepsi korupsi 
penggunaan dana desa masih rendah. 
Kata kunci: dana desa, kewenangan daerah, partisipasi masyarakat. 
INTRODUCTION 
     Indonesia created Village Law 2014 as one of the latest 
grand efforts to boost the country’s rural development. The 
most significant content in this law is the establishment of fiscal 
transfers for villages from the central government, referred to as 
Dana Desa (village fund). Community-level cash-for-work 
schemes are to be funded through this funding (Manning, 2015). 
Brojonegoro, Indonesia’s Minister of Finance states that the 
cash-forward fund aims to develop village infrastructure based 
on the principles of community work (Artharini, 2015). The 
Village Law policy resulted in the provision of significant funds 
from the national government, adding to the existing amended 
contribution to transfer funding from regencies to villages. This 
transfer of funds is henceforth referred to as village fiscal 
transfers. As a result, on average, the village budget in the years 
2015 and 2016 grew 10 times more than in the year 2014. 
     This increased budget is not given to an ordinary modern 
institution. Rather, the budget is entrusted to village 
governments, which are hybrid organizations comprised of self- 
governing communities and local self-government (Marx & 
Ghosh, 2014; Silahudin, 2015). Village governments are 
communities that perform governance functions and are 
considered the lowest government agents in Indonesia’s 
administration. Village fiscal transfers have been defined as an 
extension of the Indonesian large-scale decentralization 
initiative (Lewis, 2015; Saputro, 2015). Furthermore, 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers are an important complement 
to decentralization and permit the benefits of decentralization, 
simultaneously undoing some of its potential adverse effects 
(Boardway & Shah, 2007). 
     Controversy and curiosity are common when new policies 
are enacted. Village fiscal transfers are a stage where the policy 
has been adopted not only by civil servants at a local level, but 
also by village-level governments. Prior to village fiscal 
transfers, the village government was a passive actor in 
Indonesia’s development. 
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     Because of fiscal transfers, village fiscal availability has been 
increased to ensure development. Therefore, villages actively 
contribute to their own development. Villages have traditionally 
been the responsibility of their regency; now that villages are being 
given the funds and resources to meet their own needs, the situation 
has changed, with a power shift from the local government level to 
the village level. Moreover, this situation has created a new power 
arrangement between regencies and villages, and the actors involved 
must make appropriate adjustments. 
     From an international perspective, Marx and Ghosh (2014) offer 
a comparison of village governance in Cambodia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Papua New Guinea. This paper defines village 
governance based on the official status of a village (desa, commune, 
barangay, or ward) without referencing the level of administration 
within the local government, the role of the village, or the village’s 
governance structure (executive and legislative). 
     Before Village Law 2014 was implemented, it was investigated 
by Antlöv and Eko (2012), Antlov et al. (2016), and Sutiyo (2013). 
Antlöv and Eko (2012) show that, to ensure effective governance 
and service improvements in villages, accountability improvements 
are needed and village council functions must be strengthened to 
balance the increasing fiscal transfers and village authority. Antlov 
et al. (2016) highlight the implications of the Village Law based on 
the impact of prior policy to predict the success of the policy, 
assuming that the system is well-managed financially and provided 
that adequate legal instruments are available to exert pressure on 
village government to address community interests. Sutiyo (2013) 
studies decentralization at a village level and notes that participatory 
budgeting is a formality when rural individuals still cannot influence 
decision making. Communities may become more involved in 
project execution, but less involved in planning and evaluation. 
     Since the Village Law was implemented, it has been the subject 
of much research. Vel and Bedner (2015) highlight the potential of 
the Village Law in creating opportunities for villages to return to 
their customary village governance structures. 
     Aspinall and Rohman (2017) observe village elections 
following the implementation of the Village Law to find that the 
campaign involved vote buying, so only village elites and wealthy 
villagers could compete. Village elites are now rural brokers who 
have mutual political interests with local state elite. Salim, Bulan, 
Untung, Laksono, and Brock (2017) evaluate the role of the 
Village Law in enabling or impeding accountable governance to 
determine that the law makes village governance more accountable 
but also more complex due to requirements to report burdens and 
unclear village responsibilities. Civil participation is constrained in 
the monitoring of village elections and participation in village 
forums. 
     In investigating villages’ fiscal transfers, Lewis (2015) finds 
that poor villages receive smaller funds than villages well- 
endowed with resources such as oil and natural gas. The village 
funding allocation method emphasizes equivalent allocations per 
village, regardless of size, condition, or other sources of village 
revenue (Handra, et al., 2017). The allocation formula for village 
funding does not fully support the primary objective of the Village 
Law in terms of the equality of development and improvement of 
access to public services for poor people. Village funding is mostly 
used for infrastructure, and though infrastructure may contribute to 
poverty alleviation, the specific types of infrastructure realized by 
villages do not aid in poverty alleviation. 
     The new power arrangement for village governments is 
implemented with community-based systems, namely a self- 
governing community and local self-government. This article asks 
the following questions: 
     1) To what extent have village fiscal transfers impacted local 
     authority transfers from Banjar Regency to its villages? 
     2) How is the accountability of village governments and 
     residents’ participation ensured when villages receive the 
     village fiscal transfers? 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS, 
AUTHORITY TRANSFER, AND RESIDENT 
PARTICIPATION 
     Rondinelli and Cheema (2007) note that decentralization 
may increase the financial resources of local governments and 
provide the flexibility to respond effectively to local needs. 
However, in local governments, there is often an imbalance 
between expenditure and revenue. To address this issue, the 
central government creates intergovernmental fiscal transfers, 
which refer to the transfer of money from the central 
government to the lower levels of government (Alam, 2014). 
Thus, the two major sources of financing for local 
governments are local taxes and intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers. Fiscal transfers exist in a number of forms, such as 
subsidies, block grants, and earmarked grants. Additionally, 
fiscal transfers account for a significant portion of the national 
budget (Prud’homme, 2006). 
     Intergovernmental fiscal transfers exist to support the 
resource side of decentralization at the local level. 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are represented as a tool of 
decentralization (Boadway & Shah, 2007). In developing 
countries, fiscal transfers have become a major source of 
income for local governments, which generate limited revenue 
of their own and hence have become dependent on the central 
government (Mcmillan, 2007). The need for fiscal transfers is 
emphasized in the equity and maintenance of certain national 
standards for public services across regions (Uchimura, 2012). 
     The services that local governments typically provide can 
be categorized into two broad categories: core municipal 
services and social programs (Mcmillan, 2007). The lack of 
capacity of local bureaucrats and the local community in 
supervising may impede the increasing role of local authorities 
(Hofman, Kaiser, & Günther, 2009). 
     Assuming that “money follows functions” (see Boadway & 
Shah, 2007), the intergovernmental fiscal transfers acts as a tool of 
decentralization, aiming to share the power of the donor of fiscal 
transfers (higher levels of government) with recipients (the lower 
levels of government). Transfers to local government finances 
depend on the assignment of responsibilities and revenue sources. 
Therefore, in addition to the amount of fiscal transfers, the 
authority/responsibilities are important for the objectives of the 
fiscal transfers policy and as a part of the government’s 
decentralization objectives. Particularly in the village fiscal 
transfers policy, a new authority arrangement for the village 
government may influence authorities’ arrangement of the local 
government since village is under the responsibility of the local 
government. 
     Fiscal transfers create accountability mechanisms that affect 
fiscal management, efficiency, equity of public service provision, 
and government accountability to citizens (Shah, 2007). 
Accountability is defined as being responsible for what has 
happened and being able to explain it (Collin, 2004). The design 
of fiscal transfer schemes is crucial in successful fiscal 
decentralization (Takahashi, 2012). Indonesia’s Village Law was 
designed to be operated to ensure community empowerment, and 
so the accountability mechanisms of village fiscal transfers should 
involve resident participation. The purpose of village fiscal 
transfers is not only to boost rural development, but also to 
promote village autonomy by empowering the village government 
and encouraging residents to be actively involved in village 
development. Furthermore, village fiscal transfers should offer 
incentives to improve the village economy, thereby increasing 
welfare and reducing the poverty rate. 
CASE STUDY PROFILE AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
Indonesia is governed through three levels of administration. The 
first level is the central government, which is comprised of the 
President, ministries, and other national bodies. 
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    The second level is the provincial administration (Provinsi), and 
the third level is comprised of cities (Kota) and regencies/districts 
(Kabupaten). Both the second and third levels are defined as local 
government. Below the third level is the (sub)district (Kecamatan) 
then “Desa” that represent village-level governance and 
“Kelurahan” as field office of (sub)district. Commonly, Desa is 
used in rural communities, whereas Kelurahan is applied in urban 
or populated areas. In 2015, Indonesia had 34 Provinces, 416 
regencies/districts, 98 cities, 7,071 sub-districts, and 81,936 
villages. In 1998, Indonesia had 27 provinces, 249 districts, 65 
cities, 4,028 sub-districts, and 67,925 villages (MoHA, 2015). 
    This research is an empirical study (Romm, 2002) that uses a 
case study method (see Yin, 2014; Gerring, 2007). The case study 
method in turn involves data collection and a mixed-method 
qualitative and quantitative analysis (Creswell & Plano Clark, 
2007). Since the purpose of village fiscal transfers is the promotion 
of rural development, a remote, rural area has been chosen for the 
case study. The author has selected Banjar Regency as the study 
site because it is far from the most populous areas of Indonesia 
(Jakarta, Java Island). Moreover, the villages have varying 
geographical characteristics In Banjar Regency, most villagers 
work in agriculture, though some are also employed in mining, 
fishing, and home industries. In terms of human settlements, 
villages are mostly in the suburbs and outskirts of cities and, to a 
lesser extent, in urban areas. Banjar Regency is located in the South 
Kalimantan Province. This Regency has an area of 4,668 km2 and 
is comprised of 20 Kecamatan (sub-districts) and 277 villages. The 
author visited 19 of these sub-districts: only Paramasan, the 
remotest sub-district, was not visited. In every sub-district, the 
author met with village heads (executive) for questionnaire 
completion and interviews and with members of the village council 
(legislative) for questionnaires. The research activities were 
conducted over two periods of field visits: August–September 2016 
for discussion of accountability and resident participation and 
September–October 2017 for discussion of authority transfers. 
     Two groups of variables are explored in this article: variables 
related to the authority transfers and variables related to village 
government accountability and resident participation in village 
development. The research investigates the two groups of variables 
as follows: 
1) Authority transfers 
a. Village fiscal transfers have brought changes to village 
    authority. These changes have also influenced the authority of 
    the regency government, because village responsibilities have 
    traditionally been assigned to the regency. This change of 
    authority at the village level and regency level has also 
    influenced the working preferences of regency agencies. To 
    investigate this topic, the author conducted interviews with 
    senior bureaucrats at the regency level in Banjar Regency: 
b. To determine working preferences in Banjar Regency, the 
    author interviewed eleven senior bureaucrats (one agency head 
    and one division head per agency, except DPMD three division 
    heads and BPKAD only one division head) from the following 
    regency-level government agencies: 1) Dinas Pemberdayaan 
    Masyarakat dan Desa/DPMD (Community Empowerment and 
    Village Agency); 2) Dinas Kesehatan/DINKES (Health 
    Agency); 3) Dinas Tanaman Pangan dan Hortikultura/DISTAN 
    (Agriculture Agency); 4) Dinas Pekerjaan Umum dan Tata 
    Ruang/DISPU (Public Works and Regency Spatial Agency); 5) 
    Dinas Pendidikan/DISDIK (Education Agency); and 6) Badan 
    Pengelola Keuangan dan Aset Daerah/BPKAD (Regency 
    Finance and Asset Management Agency). 
c. In the data interpretation of authority transfers, the author uses 
    the theory of public choice, specifically bureaucratic behavior, 
    from the bureau-shaping model of Dunleavy (1991). This 
    model states that budget increases are frustrating because they 
    imply an increased workload. Therefore, senior bureaucrats 
    choose work-related utilities rather than pecuniary utilities 
    (from budget increase). According to this model, fiscal 
    transfers have resulted in an increased budget, though 
    government recipients/bureaucrats have seen opportunities to 
    gain not only pecuniary utilities (financial benefits) but also 
    working utilities/preferences. 
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2) Government accountability and resident participation in 
   development 
   a. Fiscal transfers create accountability mechanisms that 
      affect fiscal management, efficiency, equity of public 
      service provision, and government accountability to 
      citizens (Shah, 2007). Accountability is defined as being 
      responsible for what has happened and being obliged to 
      explain it (Collin, 2004). The accountability of village 
      governments in utilizing village fiscal transfers is measured 
      by asking the perception of the village council, the 
      members of which are authorized to supervise village 
      government performance. The respondents of the 
      accountability survey are 45 village council members. One 
      question represents one sub-variable. The village council is 
      asked whether they think there are corruption indicators 
      inside the village government in terms of the utilization of 
      village fiscal transfers. A total of seven questions concern 
      accountability, and one question asks about corruption 
      indicators. The data analysis is further explained in terms of 
      the development participation variable. 
   b. To investigateresident participation in village 
      development, the author did not talk to residents directly, 
      but instead chose to ask village heads and members of the 
      village council, as these individuals are representative of 
      residents and assigned to lead and coordinate village 
      governance and development. The respondents to the 
      participation variables are 69 village heads and 45 village 
      council members. One question represents one sub- 
      variable. Participation was divided into two categories: 
      whether local preferences are addressed in village 
      development (three questions) and to what extent 
      community participation has been implemented in village 
      development (five questions). 
c. In terms of the questionnaire scoring and data analysis of 
   village government accountability and resident participation 
   in development, members of the village council and village 
   heads were given five multiple choice options. These 
   options use arbitrary weighting methods with definite 
   borders between interval classes from Ferguson and Takane 
   (1989) to determine the level (degree) of accountability and 
   development participation after the village fiscal transfers 
   policy, whether it is improved or deteriorated. Answers are 
   provided on a 5-rating Likert scale defined as follows: 
5 = Highly improved (interval 
    4.51-5.00) 
4 = Slightly improved (interval 
    3.51-4.50) 
3 = Static (interval 2.51-3.50) 
2 = Slightly deteriorated (interval 
    1.51-2.50) 
1 = Highly deteriorated (interval 
    1.00-1.50) 
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d. In terms of the accountability variable, the level of 
   accountability across village government after village fiscal 
   transfers can be ascertained using the mean score of the 
   sub-variables following the score detailed above. 
e. To measure the development participation variable, 
   development participation is further analyzed using the 
   independent t-test using SPSS software (Wagner, 2015) to 
   compare the same variables across two different groups of 
   samples. The first of these groups is composed of village 
   heads, and the second group is composed of members of the 
   village council. The purpose of comparing the two groups 
   is to identify sub-variables that are not similarly answered 
   and to represent disparities in the findings. 
CASE STUDY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Regency authority transfers and local village authorities 
Fiscal transfers are given when it is necessary to fund certain 
projects (see Alam, 2014). 
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     Village fiscal transfers are given to encourage rural 
development by funding the operation of village authority. 
Before the Village Law was implemented in 2014 based on 
Government Regulation 72 (2005) with no bylaws on the 
interpretation of village authority. The clause noting “regency 
authority that is transferred to villages” in Government 
Regulation 72/2005 was changed to reference “village-scale 
authority” in Village Law 2014. According to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Regulation 44 (2016), the operation of village 
authority is first ensured by making a list of village authorities. 
The list is made by the regency government through 
coordination among various agencies. In the process of 
making the list of village authorities, the transfer of authority 
from regency to village should be ensured. The village 
authorities for synchronizing with the village budget are 
framed in four domains: village governance, village 
(infrastructure) development, village social relations, and 
community empowerment. Due to villages’ autonomous rights 
and the differences in conditions among villages, village 
authorities may choose from the list of village authorities and 
confer with the village council to stipulate the village 
authorities to be carried out in their village. It is not 
compulsory to implement all of the responsibilities from the 
list of village authorities established by the regency 
government. The list is a framework for stipulating actual 
village authority according to village character and urgency. 
     The regency government is a local government attached 
to a concurrent authority from central government. The 
concurrent authority consists of six compulsory basic services, 
namely education, health, public works, social, housing, and 
society order. This authority also includes eighteen 
compulsory non-basic services, such as labor, protection of 
women and children, transportation, culture, etc. The 
concurrent authority also consists of eight optional 
responsibilities, namely marine life and fishery, tourism, 
agriculture, forestry, energy and mineral resources, trade, 
industry, and transmigration. 
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Source: Author’s own work 
Figure 1. Regency-village authority transfers 
The process of stipulating village authorities involves regency 
agencies. At least four major regency responsibilities are 
partially transferred to village authorities. As Figure 1 shows, 
the four major responsibilities are education, health, public 
works, and agriculture. The minor responsibilities include 
fishery, energy, emergency disaster relief, social welfare, etc. 
The responsibilities that are transferred to the village can be 
divided into three categories: 
1) Infrastructure priorities: the responsibilities given to the 
    village level are mostly realized in form of infrastructure 
    projects. The limitation of regency budget strengthen that 
    the provision of village level infrastructure should be 
    carried out by the village. This infrastructure priorities 
    applied in sectors namely education, health, agriculture, 
    and public work/public facilities. 
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2) Community-based implementation: refers to the operation of 
    responsibilities that should involve resident participation. 
    Participation is important because it enables community 
    empowerment by directly benefitting community members 
    involved. Furthermore, the village government is not able to 
    manage various responsibilities such as health, education, 
    agriculture, infrastructure, due to the limited number of 
    employees and skills. Therefore, it needs residents’ participation 
    especially that has interest and skills for health, education, etc. 
3) Non-complex responsibilities: the implementation of non- 
    complex responsibilities is related to a reduction in the skills of 
    village government officials, which may lead to community- 
    based implementation and non-complex projects and operations. 
    If a project or operation is complex or requires specialized 
    knowledge and skills, the village must seek support from 
    Regency agencies. 
Dunleavy (1986; 1991) argues that there are five bureau-shaping 
strategies (see Stoker, 1995; James, 2003): the major internal 
reorganizations, the transformation of internal work practices, a 
redefinition of relationships with external ‘partners’, the competition 
with other bureaus, and the load-shedding/the hiving-off work to 
other agencies, and or the contracting out to private sector. In this 
case study, the author observes that village fiscal transfers encourage 
Banjar Regency to implement bureau-shaping model strategies, 
particularly load-shedding and hiving-off. Banjar Regency has 
thirty-four agencies, four local enterprises, and twenty (sub)districts. 
Six regency agencies currently have the most significant impact: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Community Empowerment and Village Agency (DPMD) 
Health Agency (DINKES) 
Agriculture Agency (DISTAN) 
Public Works and Regency Spatial Agency (DISPU) 
Education Agency (DISDIK) 
Regency Finance and Asset Management Agency (BPKAD) 
Because of the village fiscal transfers, agencies such as the 
DPMD and BPKAD have an increased workload, whereas 
agencies such as the DISPU, DISDIK, DISTAN, and DINKES 
lose some of their workload to village-level authorities. 
Workload may vary among agencies based on the 
responsibilities transferred to villages. But the remarks are the 
regency agencies do not necessary provide directly at the 
village level since it is all handle by the village itself. Banjar 
Regency consists of 277 villages, and the coordination of 
village handling is centralized at the DPMD. Village fiscal 
transfers are related to the disbursement of all other fiscal 
transfers, and so the DPMD coordinates and cooperates with 
the BPKAD. Coordination and cooperation are also established 
with village facilitators, which are categorized as non- 
governmental organizations given mandate by the Ministry of 
Village to facilitate in the utilization of village fiscal transfers. 
The link between the DPMD and village facilitators is strong 
since village facilitator stationed its member in the village and 
sub(district) that creates a communication bond in the form of 
DPMPD-village facilitator-village government. In this bond, 
the DPMD delegates tasks to the village facilitator to aid in 
coordinating with, supervising, and guiding villages in using 
village fiscal transfers. 
     At the village level, after receiving the list of village 
authority that originates from the Regency authority and the 
transfer of the four major responsibilities, namely education, 
health, public works, and agriculture, the village authority is 
categorized into four domains: governance, (infrastructure) 
development, social relations, and community empowerment. 
The operation of village authority is coordinated by the village 
government. Then transfer of authority happens inside the 
village to at least four organizations, such as the family welfare 
organization (PKK), the ad hoc infrastructure committee (TPK), 
the community health organization (POSYANDU), and the 
kindergarten (PAUD). The authority transferred depends on the 
responsibilities of each organization. 
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    The village government itself manages delegations because 
the organizations that exist at village level cannot handle all 
responsibilities. The village government transfers authority to 
other organizations provides them with the necessary funding. 
Post-village fiscal transfers and Regency-village authority 
transfers: Working preferences and changes in Regency 
agencies 
Following the implementation of the village fiscal transfer 
policy, the Regency authority transferred to the village level for 
the making of the village local scale authority, which provoked 
changes in various Regency agencies. Using Dunleavy’s (1985; 
1989a; 1989b) agency classification, the author maps the 
changes and includes Regency bureaucrats’ working 
preferences in terms of authority transfer: 
    a. The delivery agency carries out direct services and 
        outputs for citizens or enterprises. This agency has a 
        clear hierarchy and is labor-intensive. 
    b. The regulatory agency limits or controls the behavior of 
        individuals, enterprises, and other public-sector bodies. 
        The cost of the agency’s operation is cheaper than that 
        of the delivery agency because it is based on paper- 
        moving and supervision organizations. 
    c. The transfer agency administers government subsidies 
        or entitlement to private individuals and firms and is a 
        money-moving organization. 
    d. The contract agency develops projects in the form of 
        contracts and tenders them to the private sector. The 
        contract agency arranges in research and development, 
        preparing service specifications, contract management 
        and compliance, and other related tasks. 
    e. The control agency organizes allocates funding public 
        sector bureaus in the form of grants or 
        intergovernmental transfers. This agency supervises 
        fund spending. 
 JURNAL STUDI 
PEMERINTAHAN 
634 
    The agency that uses the bureau-shaping model should be 
more of a control, transfer, or contract agency rather than a 
delivery agency (Jung et al., 2001). This statement means that for 
bureaucrats, they are happily to change their agency classification 
to be control or transfer or contract agency rather to be a delivery 
agency. Interviews with agencies affected by village fiscal 
transfers and Regency authority transfers to villages are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Agencies’ task changes, senior bureaucrats’ preferences, and 
agency types post-village fiscal transfers 
No. 
1. 
Agencies 
DPMD 
Task change 
Theincreased 
responsibilityin 
villages creates one 
extradivisionin 
response to village 
fiscal transfers and 
export duties to village 
facilitators. 
Increasedworkload, 
BPKAD serves not 
only as money transfer 
to Regency agency, 
but also as money 
transfer to villages. 
Pre-education 
infrastructure facilities 
is given to villages, 
whichinvolves 
supervisionand 
guidance of villages to 
follow the technical 
standardsofpre- 
education. 
Community-based 
healthcare given to the 
villageinhealth 
infrastructure, 
supporting equipment, 
and village health 
servicevolunteer 
incentives 
Shares infrastructure 
responsibilitieswith 
villagesonnon- 
complex projects. 
   Senior bureaucrats’ 
        preferences 
Export duties to village 
facilitators because of 
inadequatehuman 
resources. 
Agency types 
Regulatory and transfer agency 
for managing villages and 
village fiscal transfers. 
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2. BPKAD 
3. DISDIK 
Conflict or lack of 
coordinationand 
cooperation with the 
DPMD to manage village 
fiscaltransfer 
distribution. 
Budget limitation and 
policy mandate means 
givingpre-education 
operations to village, but 
there are worries that 
villages are able to 
comply with technical 
standards. 
Transfer agency for disbursing 
village fiscal transfers. 
Regulatory agency for pre- 
schools and kindergarten at 
village level. 
4.                                               Encouragedbythe 
                                               village fiscal transfers to 
                                               give health responsibility 
                                               to villages in order to 
                                               ensure that they are 
                                               specialized in health 
                                               serviceprovision 
                                               networks. 
5.DISPUTheresponsibility 
                                               sharing couldmake 
                                               public works agencies 
                                               prioritize projects that are 
                                               equally responsible in 
                                               infrastructure provisions. 
6.DISTANThefunctionofConcedeagriculture 
                    agriculturalinfrastructure provision 
                    infrastructureto villages because the 
                    provision is given toagency has a limited 
                    villages.budget, and allowing 
                                               villages to manage it is 
                                               advantageous. 
Source: Author’s own data from interviews (2017) 
DINKES Delivery agency for district level 
health services and 
regulatory agency for village- 
level health services. 
Deliveryagency 
infrastructure provisions 
regulatoryagency 
infrastructure control. 
 for 
and 
 for 
More often regulatory agency, 
rarely delivery agency. 
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Village fiscal transfers and public finance management as a 
new challenge for village government 
     Village Law defines village government as the entity obligated 
to implement village governance, execute village development, 
maintain village social relations, and empower residents. A 
political position that functions as the territorial head (warden) 
makes the village head figures socially important, effective public 
servants for the people, and government facilitators in delivering 
government projects to the village. In implementing the fiscal 
policy, village financial management delegations are organized by 
the village head. This task means that the village head and his/her 
officials must have public finance management competence. More 
resources demand further involvement from the village head in 
financial management. 
     The village head is involved in public finance management 
coordination from planning, budgeting, expenditure/procurement, 
accounting, reporting, to performance evaluation/assessment. 
Village heads must develop skills to manage public organizations 
and their financial resources. A lack of competence may lead to 
mismanagement, which potentially creates losses of public funds 
and be perceived as corruption. Therefore, village heads must serve 
also as public finance managers. However, social participation is 
fundamental in the process of managing public funds at a village 
level. 
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Source: MoHA (2015) 
Figure 2. Village Financial Management 
     The purpose of public finance competence is to ensure the 
accountability of villages in utilizing given village fiscal 
transfers. The mechanism of accountability involves planning 
projects to reporting projects, which are funded by village fiscal 
transfers. The village government’s competence is most 
important in ensuring that projects are run properly. Resident 
participation is important in ensuring that projects meet 
residents’ needs. Moreover, computerization and e-governance 
cannot be separated from public finance management. 
Consequently, the disbursement and accountability mechanisms 
of the village fiscal transfers involve the installation of village 
financial information systems, Sistem Keuangan Desa 
(SIKDES), which require the users’ computer skills familiarity 
with the operation of the application, and an internet network to 
input and record data. For most remote villages, there is no 
internet signal, and officials may have to go to cities to access 
WiFi networks. 
The accountability of village governments in utilizing village 
fiscal transfers 
Utilizing village fiscal transfers or the village budget involves 
similar functions because village revenues originate from 
village fiscal transfers. 
Vol. 9 No. 4 
November 
2018 
The village government is obligated to be accountable to two sides, 
both village residents and members of Regency government. 
Table 2. The Accountability Of Village Government 
No. 
1. 
1.1 
1.2 
1.3 
1.5 
1.6 
1.7 
2. 
3. 
Variables/Sub-variables 
Accountability of village government 
Village government report quality to 
local government 
Frequent report to village council 
Anti-corruption effort of the village 
government 
Budget transparency of village 
government 
Village government report quality to 
village council 
Village council supervision 
convenient to village government 
Corruption Indication 
Village fiscal transfers regency 
allocation transparency* 
Minimum 
2.67 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
2.00 
2.00 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
Maximum 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
4.00 
5.00 
Mean 
4.1149 
4.0444 
3.4222 
4.3778 
4.2889 
4.4667 
4.0889 
2.0000 
4.8406 
     Std. 
  Deviation 
.50484 
.73718 
1.33976 
.68387 
.66134 
.81464 
.97286 
.85280 
.40668 
638 
Source: Author’s own survey data (2016) 
N=69 only) 
Note: Score interpretation 
5 = Highly improved (interval 4.51- 
5.00) 
4 = Slightly improved (interval 3.51- 
4.50) 
3 = Static (interval 2.51-3.50) 
(village council N=45,*Village head 
2 = Slightly deteriorated (interval 1.51- 
2.50) 
1 = Highly deteriorated (interval 1.00- 
1.50) 
   The measurement of village government accountability can be 
seen in Table 2 in terms of the perception of village council 
members. In general, the mean score shows that the accountability of 
the village government perceived to have improved, though the sub- 
variable of the frequent reports to village councils has the lowest 
mean score. The radical interpretation of this score is that village 
council members attempt to show that the village government is not 
actually reporting to them on the progress of village development or 
governance. The village head needs the village council on only two 
occasions, namely the approval of the village budget and the annual 
villagegovernancereport,LaporanKeterangan 
Pertanggungjawaban Kepala Desa (LKPJ Desa). 
     These two occasions are distinct in terms of importance If 
the village budget is not approved by the village council, the 
village budget cannot be legalized. However, the consequences 
of not submitting the LKPJ Desa are unclear. Therefore, the 
accountability of the village heads in terms of the village 
council must be reviewed and improved. On the other hand, 
accountability in terms of the Regency government is 
important. Village fiscal transfers are disbursed to the village 3 
times a year. When one period of village fiscal transfers is 
finished, and the funds have been used, the village government 
is obligated to send a report to the Regency government. If the 
report is not submitted, the next village fiscal transfer will not 
be approved. After using the whole village budget in one fiscal 
year, the village government should make a report for Regency 
government, the Laporan Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan 
Desa (LPPDesa). LPPDesa has basically the same content and 
format as the LKPJ Desa. The number of village government 
that have completed the LPPDesa and LKPJDesa is still very 
few. 
     The Regency government have the authority to supervise 
or audit village governments in the form of guidance and 
counseling. However, village governments are often concerned 
when higher levels of government audit them. The central 
government field agency for auditing villages is the supreme 
audit institution, Badan Pemeriksan Keuangan (BPK). When 
this agency audits the village government, negative findings 
may lead to legal action for corruption. This hierarchy of 
supervision and auditing means that accountability to Regency 
government is more urgent than that of residents or the village 
council. 
     The author of this paper conducted surveys on the 
corruption indicators in village government. The respondents’ 
average score was “slightly deteriorated”, which suggests that 
the village government have low corruption indicators. If this 
result is accurate, the village government is free of corruption. 
If the finding is not accurate, it may be true that village 
members intentionally intended to conceal the actual corruption 
levels with village government. 
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     The author conducted another survey on the transparency of 
the allocation of village fiscal transfers by Regency government, 
which was responded to only by village heads. The mean score of 
the findings of this survey indicate that the village heads perceive 
the Regency government as transparent in allocating village fiscal 
transfers. 
The village development system 
Village development is a system that is performed by village 
government with the principle of participatory development. 
Village development consists of three stages. The first of these 
stages is the planning stage, where village government sets a 
village development plan by publishing mid-term village 
development plans, village government work plans, and village 
budget drafts. The second stage is the execution stage, where 
village development is executed according to village government 
work plans. The third stage involves supervising village 
development, and the village residents have the right to supervise 
the whole process of village development. Village development is 
also defined as an effort to increase the life quality and welfare of 
village residents. 
     The planning stage of village development is conducted by 
village government, village council, community associations, and 
village residents. This stage is based on the inclusion principle, 
where every village resident is invited to participate in village 
planning, regardless of gender, educational background, economic 
capability, ethnicity, religion, or physical condition. There are two 
types of village development plans, namely mid-term village 
development plan, Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah 
Desa (RPJM Desa), and an annual village government work plan, 
Rencana Kerja Pemerintahan Desa (RKP Desa). 
     RPJM Desa is a list of responsibilities for the village for six 
years. This list consists of the vision and mission of the village 
head, village development policy direction, a list of village 
activities in village governance, infrastructure development, 
community relations, and community empowerment. 
     RKP Desa is the one-year version of RPJM Desa and is 
adjusted based on Regency agencies’ indicative project budgets 
that will be realized in the village and allocated fiscal transfers 
(DD, ADD, and BHPRD) for the village as village financial 
revenue. RKPD Desa is the reference for the village budget. In 
one fiscal year (from 1 January to 31 December), three items 
must be actualized as the part of village development planning: 
1) Village conference or Musyawarah Desa; 2) RKP Desa 
making; and 3) The village budget. 
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Source: MoHA (2015). 
Figure 3. Village Development Cycle 
Each village resident can propose development priorities through 
village conferences for development named MUSRENBANG. 
Representative participation allows those who are interested in 
village governance to become involved in deciding how the 
fiscal transfers are utilized. Village residents’ participation is 
measured in terms of the participation of some groups or parties 
of residents in the village conference. The groups or parties are 
largely comprised of public figures, social figures, educational 
figures, youth organizations, representatives of farmer, fishermen 
associations, etc. The degree of participation is one of factors 
that affect the village as a body of self-governing community. 
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     The execution stage of village development is coordinated by 
the village head, his/her subordinates, and village resident groups 
or parties. Village development covers village-scale development, 
as well as sectoral and Regency-/district-level development that 
affects the village. Village-scale development is executed through 
community work, inter-village cooperation, or cooperation with 
third parties or the private sector. The village head coordinates the 
preparation and implementation of village development from the 
allocation of the village budget. Sectoral and Regency-/district- 
level development is implemented according to central or local 
government regulations. The village development plan must be 
synchronized with sectoral- or Regency-level development and 
vice versa. If the sectoral- or Regency- level development projects 
are delegated to the village, prior project implementation must be 
discussed at village conferences. Then, the village head coordinates 
with his/her officials and resident groups for implementation. 
     Village development is a principle goal in village projects. 
Project mechanisms involve the village head forming an ad hoc 
committee for one or more than one projects, which is referred to 
as Tim Pengelola Kegiatan (TPK). The TPK is established on the 
principle of self-management, Swakelola. Village projects 
conducted by the TPK are different from local government-level 
projects conducted by private contractors. The TPK is responsible 
for managing projects and reporting project progress and final 
results to the village head. 
     In the supervising stage of village development, residents are 
allowed to supervise the village government in utilizing village 
fiscal transfers or enacting village development. The body that 
represents and legitimizes the supervision is the village council. 
The village residents have the right to know whether the distributed 
village fiscal transfers are used properly, or whether any indications 
of budget misuses occur. The supervision is conducted through 
village meetings, community association meetings, neighborhood 
meetings, field visits, and a study of related development plan 
documents, project documents, and other relevant documents. The 
village residents may also evaluate village development by 
attending village conferences. 
     Regency government is also allowed to monitor and evaluate 
village development by analyzing project realization and the 
outcomes of village development. If the development results are 
not as expected due to a lack of village capabilities, Regency 
government should provide guidance and advice to village 
government. 
Resident participation in village development planning and 
execution 
Development planning participation is the basic participation of 
residents in local government through accommodating residents’ 
preferences, identifying public needs, and including them in 
government action or development plans. In village fiscal 
transfer utilization mechanisms, residents’ preferences heard 
throughvillagecouncilsanddirectly invillage 
conference/forums used in arranging the mid-term and annual 
planning of village development. 
     In development execution, the purpose of resident 
participation is to ensure that that community preferences and 
needs are addressed by the government. In village fiscal 
transfers, the purpose of this participation is not just to ensure 
that the government addresses community preferences in their 
policies, but also to make village fiscal transfer utilization 
mechanism open and obligate members of communities to 
participate in the implementation of allocated fiscal transfers. 
The projects funded by village fiscal transfers are implemented 
by resident (ad hoc) groups as the TPK is strictly for villagers. 
The mechanism using the TPK has two benefits, the first of 
which is that the project is less susceptible to corruption if 
community members are involved. It is hoped that residents will 
not sabotage a project that is beneficial to their own village. 
Furthermore, village residents are closely related residents, 
therefore the project is easily supervised and reported to the 
village government and council. The second benefit is that the 
village fiscal transfer projects are hoped to empower residents by 
giving them salaries or remuneration. 
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Source: Author’s own survey data (2016, 2017) 
(village council N=45, Village head N=69) 
Note: Score interpretation 
5 = Highly improved (interval 4.51- 
5.00) 
4 = Slightly improved (interval 3.51- 
4.50) 
3 = Static (interval 2.51-3.50) 
2 = Slightly deteriorated (interval 
1.51-2.50) 
1 = Highly deteriorated (interval 1.00- 
1.50) 
        In village development, participation can be divided into 
two categories. The first category focuses on whether the local 
preferences are accommodated in village development, and the 
second category deals with to what extent residents are involved 
in village development. According to mean scores of the findings, 
local preferences are accommodated in village development and 
the utilization of village fiscal transfers. Both village heads and 
the village council have the same perceptions, all of which fall 
into the “slightly improved” category for the local preferences 
variables. Only the variable that deals with community needs 
being addressed falls in the category “highly improved”. The 
author distinguishes between community needs and community 
aspirations even though they are similar because the purpose of 
this paper is to emphasize and enrich local preferences. 
Community needs refer to primary needs that could be 
accommodated in village development. 
Community aspirations refer to what the community wants 
regardless of its importance. The author was able to make five 
key observations in the field: 
1) The significance of the village council and village- 
     government relations 
     The village government-village council relationship is 
imbalanced because there are disparities between responses 
from village heads and those of village council members. This 
relationship is added as the sub-variable “resident participation” 
because a weak relationship between these two entities means a 
lack of cooperation and involvement of the community. On 
average, more village heads think that the relationship is 
negative compared to village council members. The reason for 
this result may be that the village heads perceive that the village 
council is not adequately contributing to village governance 
despite remuneration. Furthermore, village governance largely 
relies on the village head and his/her officials, and the unclear 
job roles of the village council. If the village council likes the 
village head too much (having a very good relations), the 
village head will dominate all policy-making in the village, 
which will lead to a concentration of authority on the village 
head that could harm village democratic processes in 
development and lead to the corruption of power. On the other 
hand, the village head should have a rival to limit or control this 
concentration of power in the village. The village council 
should be seen as a partner of the village head. 
2) The village council is now more involved in 
     development planning than residents 
    Varying scores were also obtained in responses to questions 
on village councils’ involvement in development planning and 
residents’ involvement in development planning. The village 
heads may answer these questions more positively because they 
are the individuals responsible for inviting representatives from 
societies to be involved in planning development projects. 
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Village heads therefore feel that they have complied with their duty 
to involve representatives in village development. Based on the 
scores in Table 3, village councils perceive that resident participation 
is lower than village council participation in development planning. 
In conferences to determine village projects for village fiscal 
transfers utilization, the main actors invited are village council 
members, the neighborhood head, and important village figures. In 
terms of resident participation, ordinary village residents are not 
invited or willing to attend. 
     3) The increased importance of planning documents RPJM 
         Desa and RKP Desa 
     Village development planning processes were a necessary part 
in the village development even before the publication of the Village 
Law in 2014. Before the provision of village fiscal transfers, there 
were few resources (funding) that allowed villages to execute their 
own development planning. RPJM Desa and RKP Desa, as a 
projection of village development planning, are planning documents 
that allowed for the realization of development projects in the field. 
When the Village Law was implement, the importance of village 
development planning did not change significantly. RPJM Desa and 
RKP Desa are placed as the mandatory document for withdrawing 
the village fiscal transfers from the Regency bank account only. This 
mindset for RPJM Desa and RKP Desa lessens the importance of 
these two reports’ content. Because of this way it might be the RPJM 
Desa and RKP Desa is made by the village government only and 
does not invite the village council or village residents in making it. 
When implementing projects for the utilization of village fiscal 
transfers, which is important in development planning, the village 
government discusses it with the village council, neighborhood head, 
and some residents because it is directly affects the community. 
4) The bottom-up project’s determination mechanisms 
    A village is divided into neighborhoods or Rukun Tetangga 
(RT). The model for determining village projects is involves bottom- 
up planning, where the projects first come from the neighborhood 
and are then proposed to the village. 
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Competition occurs between neighborhoods in terms of who will be 
prioritized on the project list because the village fiscal transfer 
budget is limited. If one neighborhood does not get a project one 
year, it is promised the project for the next year. Consideration of 
the project depends on current development level, which means that 
neighborhoods that are adequately developed do not often have 
their projects prioritized. Furthermore, if the from village fiscal 
transfer budget is too small and cannot be divided based on 
neighborhoods, the village head decides, on behalf of the village 
government, the projects that are to be carried out. 
5) Village head control on ad hoc committee TPK 
    The perception mean scores among village heads and village 
councils are in the same category because in project execution, it is 
obligatory to use residents as workers. TPK are units that consist of 
3-5 members. The village head has a significant influence on TPK 
membership. There are two models of TPK membership, the first 
of which allows only residents to be members, whereas the second 
allows village officials and residents to be members. Village 
council members are prohibited from being in the TPK. The most 
favorable model of TPK membership found in the field is the 
second model because residents are often unable to manage the 
administration of village projects. Furthermore, the village head 
may more easily influence TPK work if one or more of the 
members is a village official. The village officials that are most 
commonly assigned as members of the TPK are the neighborhood 
head and the head of developmental Affairs. 
CONCLUSION 
        Village fiscal transfers fund four domains of village 
authority, namely governance, (infrastructure) development, social 
relations, and community empowerment. These transfers coincide 
with this arrangement the Regency transfer some of its authority. 
Using Dunleavy’s (1991) theory, fiscal transfers follow the bureau- 
shaping strategy of authority transfer from the Regency to villages. 
The authority transfer gives legitimacy to the village in utilizing the 
allocated funds of fiscal transfers. 
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The authority transfer from the Regency to villages changes the 
working preferences of Regency agencies that may lead to 
changes in agency type. Using the agency types of Dunleavy 
(1991) as a model, Regency delivery agencies decrease their 
work volume and change agency type for village-level public 
provisions as regulatory agencies. Agencies that deal with 
managing villages as regulatory and control agencies and 
managing fiscal transfers as transfer agencies have seen increased 
workloads. One thing common among Regency delivery, 
regulatory, control, and transfer agencies, is that they are all in 
favor of broad policy-level work. Therefore, Regency delivery 
agencies have no opposition to exporting work to villages. 
Regency regulatory and control agencies with increased 
workloads can export their burden to quasi-governmental units, 
who are often village facilitators with a lack of human resources 
experience. Transfer agencies often conflict with regulatory and 
control agencies since they both have similar responsibilities and 
cannot equally divide tasks. According to the bureau-shaping 
model of Dunleavy (1991), in terms of working preferences, both 
agencies fight to maintain the image of the agency. Regency 
agency type changes are delivery agency change as regulatory 
agency for village-level public provisions, and workload 
increases for regulatory, control, and transfer agencies. 
     The accountability of the usage of village fiscal transfers is 
outlined by central government and the Regency government. 
Due to accountability, village governments must ensure that 
finances are properly managed, which can often be a challenge 
because village are often offered significant budget increments 
that must be used according to regulations. To ensure adequate 
public finance management, the village government should be 
competent in public finance management, particularly in terms of 
planning, budgeting, procurement, accounting, and governance. 
Modern administration is conducted digitally, and so computer 
skills are mandatory for village government officials. The village 
council must also supervise the work of village governments and 
must properly understand legislation and representation. 
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     The accountability of the village government is important for 
the utilization of the village fiscal transfers. The author collected 
perceptions of the village council, who have the authority to 
supervise village government. All accountability sub-variables 
show that there have been improvements in the utilization of 
village fiscal transfers. However, it should be noted that the 
submission of reports to the village council is infrequent. These 
findings suggest that accountability is concentrated on upward 
accountability to the Regency government, who are responsible 
for providing the village fiscal transfers. 
     The infrequent reports to the village council is a reflection of 
low downward accountability to residents. Upward accountability 
has real consequences, in that upcoming village fiscal transfers 
will be postponed if the adequate documents are not reported to 
Regency government. On the other hand, downwards 
accountability is not perceived as important, despite the village 
council playing an important role in legalizing fiscal transfers. To 
improve downward accountability, Regency government should 
establish proper consequences if village governments are not 
accountable to residents. 
     In terms of resident participation in village development, the 
RPJM Desa and RKP Desa are important and serve as the only 
compulsory reports to be submitted before the allocation of 
village fiscal transfers. The writing of these planning reports 
involves resident participation, and the results of this paper’s 
survey show that resident preferences are addresses. The village 
council reported feeling more involved in planning than village 
residents. The most important phase of village development 
planning for residents is the project determination, which uses 
bottom-up project determination. The village head coordinates 
projects based on the aim that every neighborhood receives at 
least one project. 
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     Village residents, as village representatives, are involved in 
development execution. Furthermore, the responses to the survey 
suggest that the relationship between village government and the 
village council is not always harmonious for some villages, 
which may affect both parties’ co-operation in executing 
development project. In the execution of village development 
projects, the ad hoc committee for project management, TPK, is 
influenced by the village head, in that he/she ensures that at least 
one member is a village official. Village officials are used 
because of their administration skills, while also allowing the 
village head to control the working process of the committee 
more easily using his/her subordinate(s). 
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